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Abstract 
 
We assess the sustainability of public finances in the EU15 over the period 1970-2006 
using stationarity and cointegration analysis. Specifically, we use panel unit root tests 
of the first and second generation allowing in some cases for structural breaks. We 
also apply modern panel cointegration techniques developed by Pedroni (1999, 2004), 
generalized by Banerjee and Carrion-i-Silvestre (2006) and Westerlund and Edgerton 
(2007), to a structural long-run equation between general government expenditures 
and revenues. While estimations point to fiscal sustainability being an issue in some 
countries, fiscal policy was sustainable both for the EU15 panel set, and within sub-
periods (1970-1991 and 1992-2006). 
 
Keywords: intertemporal budget constraint, fiscal sustainability, EU, panel unit root, 
panel cointegration. 
 
JEL Classification Numbers: C23, E62, H62, H63. 
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Non-technical summary 
 
The sustainability of public finances is a key policy issue for the European Union 
(EU). Within the EU fiscal framework, fiscal discipline is an important support for the 
implementation of monetary policy, particularly in the case of the European and 
Monetary Union (EMU) countries. In EMU, the existence of sound fiscal policies is 
seen as a necessary objective for individual countries to pursue. For example, it is not 
possible to discard adverse responses from the financial markets when fiscal 
behaviour is deemed to be unsustainable. Indeed, the accumulation of government 
debt, following continued budgetary imbalances, may in the end trigger the need for 
higher long-term interest rates in order to place additional sovereign debt in the 
markets. Moreover, the Treaties governing the EU also require sustainable public 
finances. Countries are urged to comply with the budgetary requirements of EMU, by 
avoiding excessive deficits, keeping government debt levels below the 60 percent of 
GDP reference value, and respecting the requirements of the Stability and Growth 
Pact (SGP). 
 
The aim of this paper is to examine the sustainability of public finances for the EU15 
countries (covering the EU Member States before the 1 May 2004 enlargement) by 
applying recent advances in the econometrics of non-stationary panel data methods. 
The econometric literature on unit roots and cointegration testing has been expanding 
rapidly, and now distinguishes between the first generation tests developed on the 
assumption of cross-section independence (except for common time effects), and the 
second generation tests that allow, in a variety of forms and degrees, the dependence 
that might prevail across the different units in the panel. In the context of our paper, 
cross-dependence can mirror possible changes in the behaviour of fiscal authorities 
related to the signing of the EU Treaty in Maastricht on 7 February 1992, with the 
setting up of the fiscal convergence criteria that urged the EU countries to consolidate 
public finances in the run-up to the EMU on 1 January 1999, when most EU legacy 
currencies were replaced by the euro, and in the context of the SGP since then. 
 
The econometric methods used in the paper to assess the sustainability of public 
finances in the EU15 rest upon (i) individual unit root tests allowing in some cases for 
structural breaks; (ii) first generation panel data integration tests that assume cross- 
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sectional independence among panel units (apart from common time effects); (iii) two 
second generation panel data unit root tests that relax the assumption of cross-
sectional independence; (iv) panel data unit root tests that enable to accommodate 
structural breaks, and (v) the panel data cointegration tests developed by Pedroni 
(1999, 2004) and generalized by Banerjee and Carrion-i-Silvestre (2006), and  the 
bootstrap panel cointegration test by Westerlund and Edgerton (2007). 
 
The results from these panel unit root tests, allowing for structural breaks, support the 
results of both the first and second generation panel data unit root tests, leading us to 
conclude that the first difference of stock of public debt series is integrated of order 
zero, thus indicating that the solvency condition would be satisfied for EU15 
countries, which is a necessary condition for fiscal policy sustainability. Moreover, 
our results also show that general government expenditure and the revenue series are 
integrated of order one.  
 
Even if the results of the analysis may question fiscal sustainability in some cases 
when taken individually, it is nevertheless true that the tests point to the solvency of 
government public finances when considering the EU15 panel data set. This is an 
advantage of the panel approach, since the time series dimension of the data is not that 
long for individual countries. Even if there is no single fiscal policy in the EU, the 
panel sustainability of public finances indicated by our results is relevant in a context 
of EU countries seeking to pursue sound fiscal policy behaviour within the Stability 
and Growth Pact framework. 
 
Interestingly, the panel cointegration results for the entire 1970-2006 period allow us 
to draw the conclusion that a long-run relationship does exist between general 
government revenue and expenditure for the set of EU15 countries, at least at the 10 
per cent level of significance, both using conventional (asymptotic) critical values 
given in Pedroni (1999), and bootstrap panel cointegration proposed by Westerlund 
and Edgerton (2007). Moreover, this conclusion holds for the two sub-periods, 1970-
1991 and 1992-2006 (broadly before and after the Maastricht Treaty) for most of the 
cointegration tests carried out. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The sustainability of public finances is a key policy issue for the European Union 
(EU). Within the EU fiscal framework, fiscal discipline is an important support for the 
implementation of monetary policy, particularly in the case of the EMU member 
countries. In EMU, the existence of sound fiscal policies is seen as a necessary 
objective for individual countries to pursue. It is not possible to exclude adverse 
responses from the financial markets when fiscal behaviour is deemed to be 
unsustainable. Indeed, the accumulation of government debt, following continued 
budgetary imbalances, may in the end trigger the need for higher long-term interest 
rates in order to place additional sovereign debt in the markets.
1 Moreover, the 
Treaties governing the EU also require sustainable public finances. Countries are 
urged to comply with the budgetary requirements of EMU, by avoiding excessive 
deficits, keeping debt levels below the 60 percent of GDP reference value, and 
respecting the requirements of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP).
2 
 
The aim of this paper is to examine the sustainability of public finances for the EU15 
countries (covering the EU Member States before the 1 May 2004 enlargement) by 
applying recent advances in the econometrics of non-stationary panel data methods.
3 
The econometric literature on unit roots and cointegration testing has been expanding 
rapidly, and now distinguishes between the first generation tests developed on the 
assumption of cross-section independence (except for common time effects), and the 
second generation tests that allow, in a variety of forms and degrees, the dependence 
that might prevail across the different units in the panel. This question is crucial and 
responds to the complex nature of the interactions and dependencies that generally 
exist over time and across the individual units in the panel. For instance, observations 
on firms, industries, regions and countries tend to be cross-correlated as well as 
serially dependent. As pointed out by Breitung and Pesaran (2005), the problem of 
cross-section dependence is particularly difficult to deal with since it could arise for a 
                                                 
1 Afonso et al. (2007) report evidence on the relevance of fiscal variables as determinants of sovereign 
credit ratings, which also points to the need for sound fiscal policies. 
2 See Morris et. al (2006) on the revised framework of the SGP. 
3 The countries are: Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Finland, Sweden and the UK.  
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variety of reasons, including spatial spillover effects, common unobserved shocks, 
social interactions, or a combination of these factors. 
 
In the context of our paper, cross-dependence can mirror possible changes in the 
behaviour of fiscal authorities related to the signing of the EU Treaty in Maastricht on 
7 February 1992, with the setting up of the convergence criteria that urged the EU 
countries to consolidate public finances in the run-up to the EMU on 1 January 1999, 
when most EU legacy currencies were replaced by the euro, and in the context of the 
SGP since then. 
 
Generally, fiscal sustainability is considered on a country basis and can usually only 
be restored by changing national fiscal policies. From a monetary policy point of 
view, fiscal policy in the current institutional setting of EMU must be considered a 
largely national competence and responsibility. Although, even if there is no single 
fiscal policy in the EU, a panel sustainability analysis of public finances has to be 
seen as relevant in a context of EU countries seeking to pursue common and sound 
fiscal policy behaviour within the SGP framework. Possible cross-country 
dependence can be envisaged either in the run-up to EMU or, for example, via 
integrated financial markets. Indeed, with cross-country spillovers in government 
bond markets especially after the completion of the single EU15 capital market from 
1994 were to be expected, interest rates comovements inside the EU became also 
more noticeable. 
 
To the best of our knowledge, few comparable studies have taken into account the 
possible cross-sectional dependence among countries when investigating the 
sustainability of public finances for the EU15 countries. A few studies provide panel 
unit root and panel cointegration analysis in this context, notably Prohl and Schneider 
(2006), for eight OECD countries and Claeys (2007) for the EU (not allowing for 
cross-section dependence). Indeed, although the main analytical techniques used to 
analyse the sustainability of public finances have been stationarity tests for the stock 
of public debt and cointegration tests between government expenditures and 
government revenues, this has been mostly performed for individual countries, which  
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sometimes poses the problem of relatively short time series.
4 This paper takes these 
results in the literature regarding the sustainability of public finances, and assesses 
them to see whether they still hold when more powerful cointegration techniques are 
employed in a panel framework.  
 
Our econometric methodology uses three approaches for unit root testing: panel data 
integration tests of “first generation” (Breitung, 2000; Choi, 2006; Hadri, 2000; Im, 
Pesaran and Shin, 2003; Levin, Lin and Chu, 2002; Maddala and Wu, 1999), which 
assume cross-sectional independence among panel units (except for common time 
effects); panel data unit root tests of the “second generation” (Choi, 2006; Moon and 
Perron, 2004), which allow for more general forms of cross sectional dependency  
(not only limited to common time effects); and panel unit root tests that allow for 
structural breaks (Im and Lee, 2001). We also implement panel cointegration 
techniques developed by Pedroni (1999, 2004), and generalised by Banerjee and 
Carrion-i-Silvestre (2006) and Westerlund and Edgerton (2007), to a structural long-
run equation between general government expenditures and revenues. To make the 
analysis robust, the results of panel data unit root tests are also compared with those 
obtained with individual unit root tests. 
 
The advantages of panel data methods within the macro-panel setting include the use 
of data for which the spans of individual time series data are insufficient for the study 
of many hypotheses of interest. Other benefits include better properties of the testing 
procedures when compared to more standard time series methods, and the fact that 
many of the issues studied, such as convergence, purchasing power parity or the 
sustainability of public finances, naturally lend themselves to being studied in a panel 
context.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In section two we briefly review 
the analytical framework of public finance sustainability. In section three we present a 
brief overview of our fiscal data. In section four we perform the stationarity analysis 
                                                 
4 Examples of empirical tests of fiscal sustainability on an individual country basis are provided, for 
instance, by Hamilton and Flavin (1986), Trehan and Walsh (1991), Kremers (1988), Wilcox (1989), 
Hakkio and Rush (1991), Tanner and Liu (1994), Quintos (1995), Haug (1991), Ahmed and Rogers 
(1995), Payne (1997), Bohn (1998), Fève and Hénin (2000), Uctum and Wickens (2000), Bergman 
(2001), Bravo and Silvestre (2002), and Afonso (2005a).  
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of the fiscal series. In section five we report the cointegration results for the general 
government expenditure and revenue series. Finally, section six concludes the paper.  
 
2. The analytical framework of public finance sustainability 
 
In the beginning of the 1920s, when writing about the public debt problem faced by 
France, Keynes (1923) highlighted the need for the French government to conduct a 
sustainable fiscal policy in order to satisfy its budget constraint. Keynes stated that the 
absence of sustainability would be evident when “the State's contractual liabilities 
(…) have reached an excessive proportion of the national income” (p. 54). 
 
In modern terms, the sustainability of public finances is challenged when the 
government debt-to-GDP ratio reaches an excessive value. There is a problem of 
sustainability when the government revenues are not enough to keep on financing the 
costs associated with the new issuance of public debt or, again in Keynes words, when 
“it has become clear that the claims of the bond-holders are more than the tax payers 
can support” (p. 55). At that point the government will have to take measures that 
restore the sustainability of fiscal policy, meaning that the State “must come in due 
course to some compromise between increasing taxation, and diminishing 
expenditure, and reducing what (…) [it] owe[s]” (p. 59). 
 
From an analytical perspective, the issue of fiscal policy sustainability can be 
presented in a straightforward way with the so-called present value borrowing 
constraint (PVBC). In order to derive the PVBC of a single country, the flow 
government budget constraint for a given period t can be written as 
 
  t t t t t B R B r G + = + + −1 ) 1 ( , (1) 
 
where G is the primary government expenditure, R is the government revenue, B is 
the government debt, and r is the real interest rate.
5 Rewriting (1) for the subsequent 
periods, and recursively solving that equation leads to the following intertemporal 
budget constraint:  
                                                 
5 For the validation of theoretical results, the real interest rate is sometimes assumed in the literature to 
be stationary, but this is a much more difficult assumption for the nominal interest rate.  
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When the second term from the right-hand side of equation (2) is zero, the present 
value of the existing stock of public debt will be identical to the present value of 
future primary surpluses. For empirical purposes it is useful to make several algebraic 
modifications to equation (1). Assuming that the real interest rate is stationary, with 
mean r, and defining 
 
  1 ) ( − − + = t t t t B r r G E , (3) 
 
it is possible to obtain the following PVBC:   
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A sustainable fiscal policy needs to ensure that the present value of the stock of public 
debt, the second term of the right hand side of (4), goes to zero in infinity, 
constraining the debt to grow no faster than the real interest rate. In other words, it 
implies imposing the absence of Ponzi games and the fulfilment of the intertemporal 
budget constraint. Faced with this transversality condition, the government will have 
to achieve future primary surpluses whose present value adds up to the current value 
of the stock of public debt.
6  
 
It is also worth noting that the hypothesis of fiscal policy sustainability is related to 
the condition that the trajectory of the main macroeconomic variables is not affected 
by the choice between the issuance of public debt and the increase in taxation. Under 
such conditions, it would therefore be irrelevant how the deficits are financed, which 
also implies the assumption of the Ricardian Equivalence hypothesis.
7 
                                                 
6 McCallum (1984) discusses whether this is a necessary condition to obtain an optimal growth 
trajectory for the stock of public debt. 
7 Afonso (2005b) provides evidence of overall Ricardian behaviour on the part of EU15 governments.  
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In addition, one can also derive the solvency condition, with all the variables defined 
as a percentage of GDP.
8 The PVBC, with the variables expressed as ratios of GDP, 
with  y  being the real GDP growth rate, and neglecting for presentation purposes 
seigniorage revenues, is then written as  
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Assuming the real interest rate to be stationary, with mean r, and considering also 
constant real GDP growth, the budget constraint is then given by 
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with bt = Bt/Yt, et = Et/Yt and ρt = Rt/Yt. When r > y, it is necessary to introduce a 
solvency condition, given by  0
1
1 lim
) 1 (
= ⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎝
⎛
+
+
∞ →
+
+
s
s t r
y
b
s , in order to bound public debt 
growth.
9 This yields the familiar result that fiscal policy will be sustainable if the 
present value of the future stream of primary surpluses, as a percentage of GDP, 
matches the “inherited” stock of government debt. In a similar fashion, looking at the 
US after the end of the Second World War, Domar (1944) pointed out that it would be 
possible to sustain successive primary budget deficits as long as the real growth rate 
surpasses the real interest rate (y > r). 
 
A common practice in the literature is to investigate past fiscal data to see if 
government debt follows a stationary process or to establish if there is cointegration 
between government revenues and government expenditures.
10  
 
                                                 
8 For instance, Hakkio and Rush (1991) suggest that an analysis based on ratios (to GDP) is more 
appropriate for growing economies. 
9 This implies that the growth rate of the debt-to-GDP ratio should be less than the 
factor()
) 1 ( ) 1 /( ) 1 (
+ + +
s r y .  
10 Hamilton and Flavin (1986) first used these procedures. See also Trehan and Walsh (1991) and 
Hakkio and Rush (1991).  
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Recalling the PVBC in equation (4), it is possible to ascertain empirically the absence 
of Ponzi games by testing the stationarity of the first difference of the stock of public 
debt, using unit root tests both at the country level and for a European panel. It is also 
possible to assess fiscal policy sustainability through cointegration tests. The implicit 
hypothesis concerning the real interest rate, with mean r, is also stationarity. Using 
again the auxiliary variable  1 ) ( − − + = t t t t B r r G E , and the additional definition 
1 − + = t t t t B r G GG , the intertemporal budget constraint may also be written as   
 
  1
0
1 ) 1 (
lim
) (
) 1 (
1
+
+
∞
=
+ + − + ∞ →
+ ∆ − ∆
+
= − ∑ s
s t
s
s t s t s t t r
B
s
E R
r
R GG , (7) 
 
and with the no-Ponzi game condition, GGt and Rt must be cointegrated variables of 
order one for their first differences to be stationary. 
 
Assuming that R and E are non-stationary variables, and that the first differences are 
stationary variables, this implies that the series R and E in levels are I (1). Then, for 
equation (7) to hold, its left-hand side will also have to be stationary. If it is possible 
to conclude that GG and R are integrated of order 1, these two variables should be 
cointegrated with cointegration vector (1, -1) for the left-hand side of equation (7) to 
be stationary. 
 
The procedure to assess the sustainability of the intertemporal government budget 
constraint therefore involves testing the following cointegration regression: 
t t t u bGG a R + + = . If the null of no cointegration, i.e. the hypothesis that the two I(1) 
variables are not cointegrated, is rejected (with a high-test statistic), this implies that 
one should accept the alternative hypothesis of cointegration. For that result to hold 
true, the series of the residual ut must be stationary, and should not display a unit root.
  
 
Hakkio and Rush (1991) also demonstrate that if GG and R are non-stationary 
variables in levels, the condition 0 < b < 1 is a sufficient condition for the budget 
constraint to be obeyed. However, when government revenues and expenditures are 
expressed as a percentage of GDP (or in per capita terms), it is necessary to have b =  
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1 in order for the trajectory of the government debt to GDP ratio not to diverge in an 
infinite horizon.
11  
 
In terms of our subsequent empirical analysis, we will assess the stationarity of 
government debt, a sufficient but not necessary condition for fiscal sustainability, and 
the existence of cointegration between government revenues and expenditures, a 
necessary condition for fiscal sustainability. 
 
3. Fiscal data overview 
 
All data are taken from the European Commission AMECO (Annual Macro-
Economic Data) database, covering the period 1970-2006 for the EU15 countries. The 
precise AMECO codes are reported in Appendix A, and Table 1 reports summary 
statistics for our main fiscal variables.  
 
In the period 1970-2006 the highest government debt-to-GDP ratios were recorded in 
Belgium, Italy, Greece and Ireland, related to high budget deficits incurred by those 
countries, and resulted notably in the pushing up of interest payments. The 
government expenditure-to-GDP ratios ranged overall between some 20 per cent and 
70 per cent, with the lower values being recorded in the beginning of the period, while 
the government revenue-to-GDP ratios were in the interval between 20 and 60 per 
cent. Additionally, visual inspection of the revenue and expenditure time series as a 
ratio of GDP, as exemplified in Figure 1 for selected countries, and in advance of the 
subsequent econometric analysis, may help to assess sustainability issues in individual 
cases. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11 Quintos (1995), Ahmed and Rogers (1995) and Bergman (2001) discuss the necessary conditions for 
sustainability in terms of the order of integration of public debt.   
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Table 1 – Statistical summary for fiscal variables (% of GDP, 1970-2006) 
 
 Government  debt  Primary  balance 
Country  Mean  Max Min  n  Mean  Max Min  n 
Austria  48.0 67.9 16.7  37  0.9  3.5  -2.0  37 
Belgium 97.9  133.4  54.3  37  2.0  6.8  -4.8  37 
Denmark  48.3  80.1 6.2  36  4.5 11.6 -3.0  37 
Finland 26.6  57.8  6.1  36  4.0  9.7  -3.3  37 
France  42.3 66.6 19.8  30  0.2  1.9  -2.3  37 
Germany  42.5 67.9 18.0  37  0.2  2.8  -4.1  37 
Greece  67.2  114.0  17.5 30 -0.7 5.0 -6.7 37 
Ireland 67.5  112.9  25.8  37  0.8  6.6  -7.3  37 
Italy  84.9  121.5  37.4 37 -0.7 6.6 -6.7 37 
Luxembourg 9.3  20.3  4.1  37  2.6  6.4  -1.6  37 
Netherlands  60.6 78.5 39.6  32  1.7  5.0  -1.3  37 
Portugal  47.7 67.4 14.2  34  -0.4  3.9  -7.4  37 
Spain  37.3 66.8 11.8  32  0.0  3.1  -4.4  37 
Sweden  49.2 73.2 24.6  34  4.0  10.3 -5.6  37 
United  Kingdom 49.9 77.4 33.4  37  1.1  6.8  -4.8  37 
  
Government revenue 
 
Government expenditure 
Country  Mean  Max Min  n  Mean  Max Min  n 
Austria  48.0 52.5 38.3  37  50.1 56.7 37.1  37 
Belgium  46.3 51.1 38.1  37  51.6 62.1 40.2  37 
Denmark  52.9 58.1 44.0  37  52.6 60.6 39.5  37 
Finland  48.9 57.1 33.6  37  46.5 64.7 29.5  37 
France  46.2 50.9 37.1  37  48.4 54.5 36.5  37 
Germany  44.3 46.6 39.6  37  46.6 49.9 39.1  37 
Greece  34.0 47.0 22.5  37  40.3 52.0 22.6  37 
Ireland  36.5 43.6 29.2  37  40.9 53.2 31.6  37 
Italy  38.7 47.6 27.9  37  46.2 56.3 32.1  37 
Luxembourg  40.4 44.4 27.8  35  38.5 45.2 25.3  35 
Netherlands  48.5 53.8 41.2  37  51.0 59.2 42.7  37 
Portugal  32.6 43.5 20.6  37  36.9 47.8 18.6  37 
Spain  32.8 40.1 20.9  37  35.2 46.6 20.3  37 
Sweden  57.4 62.3 46.0  37  57.6 72.4 41.8  37 
United  Kingdom 39.8 44.1 34.9  37  42.3 45.4 36.9  37 
Source: European Commission AMECO database. 
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Figure 1 – Fiscal variables for selected countries 
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c - Italy  d – United Kingdom 
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Source: European Commission AMECO database. 
 
4. Stationarity analysis of fiscal series 
 
In this section we study the stationarity of the fiscal series in our country panel, 
specifically the stock of government debt in real terms and the ratios to GDP of 
government revenue and government expenditure, using several unit root tests, which 
allow notably for cross-country independence and dependence, and for structural 
breaks.  
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4.1. Standard (individual) unit root tests 
 
The first step of the analysis is to look at the data univariate properties and to 
determine the degree of integration of our fiscal series, and also to assess the 
existence of a unit root in the first difference of the stock of government debt. 
Theoretically, a process is either I(0), I(1) or I(2). Nevertheless, in practice many 
variables or variable combinations are borderline cases, so that distinguishing 
between a strongly autoregressive I(0) or I(1) process (interest rates are a typical 
example), or between a strongly autoregressive I(1) or I(2) process (nominal prices 
are a typical example) is far from easy. Therefore, we have applied a sequence of 
standard unit root tests (Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test; the Phillips-Perron 
(PP) test, 1988; the Kwiatkowsky, Phillips and Shin (KPSS) test, 1992; the Elliot, 
Rothenberg, and Stock Point Optimal (ERS) test, 1996; and the Ng and Perron (NP) 
tests, 2001), to investigate which of the I(0), I(1), I(2) assumptions is most likely to 
hold.
12  
 
All these tests have been implemented for the first difference of the stock of 
government debt at 1995 constant prices, while taking general government 
expenditure and the general government revenue as a percentage of GDP. The results 
for a model with a constant and no trend are reported in Tables B1, B2 and B3 in 
Appendix B (respectively for the debt, revenue and expenditure variables).
13  
 
According to the ADF tests (see Table B1 in Appendix B), the first difference of the 
stock of public debt seems to be non-stationary in most countries, since the null of a 
unit root is rejected at the five per cent level of significance only for Austria, Finland, 
France, the UK and Sweden, indicating that the solvency condition would not be 
satisfied for ten out of the 15 EU15 countries. At the ten per cent level of significance, 
the non-stationarity hypothesis would also be rejected for Germany and the 
Netherlands. A similar result is obtained by the PP test, where the unit root 
assumption is rejected at the five per cent level only for Austria, Ireland, Luxembourg 
and Sweden. The Ng-Perron test more or less confirms this, suggesting that real 
                                                 
12 These tests are sufficiently well known, and the reader will find references at the end of the paper. 
13  If the estimated model also includes a linear trend then all tests conclude in favor of a unit root in 
the debt, revenues and expenditures for all EU15 countries.  
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government debt is not stationary at the five per cent level for most EU15 countries 
except for Austria, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK. 
Additionally, one notices that these results are in line with the ones reported by 
Afonso (2005a) for the period 1970-2003.
14 
 
The KPSS test that considers the null hypothesis of stationarity against the alternative 
unit root hypothesis confirms these results. Finally, the results given by the ERS test 
are in accordance with the previous ones and favour the non-stationarity of the first 
difference of the stock of government debt for EU15 countries, with the notable 
exceptions of Austria, Finland, France, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK.
15  
 
Concerning the general government expenditure and revenue-to-GDP ratios, four 
standard unit root tests out of five (the ADF, PP, Ng-Perron and ERS tests) indicate 
that the two series would be non-stationary in levels for most countries. Note that the 
ERS test is similar to an ADF "t" test, as performed by Dickey-Fuller, but has the best 
overall performance in terms of small-sample size and power, dominating the 
ordinary Dickey-Fuller test. The problem here is that the test critical values are 
calculated for 50 observations and may not be accurate for a sample size with a time 
dimension of 37 observations. Consequently, the results obtained with this test may 
be questionable. The KPSS test provides relatively similar results for general 
government revenues (which are found to be non-stationary at the five per cent level 
of significance except for Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands and UK), but the 
opposite results for general government expenditures (which appear to be stationary at 
the five per cent level of significance except for Finland, France, Ireland, Portugal and 
Spain). 
 
4.2. Individual unit root tests allowing for structural breaks  
 
The results obtained in the previous section are based on the assumption that no 
structural break exists in the series under consideration. However, it is now well-
                                                 
14 According to Afonso (2005a), general government revenues and expenditures are cointegrated only 
for Austria, Finland, Germany and the Netherlands, but the cointegration coefficient is quite below 
unity. Furthermore, for Belgium, Denmark, Portugal and the UK, there are significant structural breaks 
in the cointegration relationship. 
15 Note that as it is a one-sided unit root test, with the alternative H1:ρ<1, a calculated statistic smaller than the 
tabulated critical value will lead to the rejection of the null H1:ρ=1.  
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established that examining time series for the presence of structural breaks is an 
important component of any empirical analysis. Indeed, the standard unit root tests 
have serious power distortions in the presence of structural breaks, which could be the 
case, for instance, for Germany following reunification in 1990. For this reason, we 
now investigate this issue, using two endogenous unit root tests for structural breaks, 
the Zivot and Andrews (1992) and the Lumsdaine and Papell (1997) tests.
16 
 
We use the C version of the sequential trend break model proposed by Zivot and 
Andrews (1992) to investigate the presence of a unit root in the first difference of the 
stock of public debt at 1995 constant prices, and the general government expenditure 
and the general government revenue-to-GDP ratios. This model combines the one-
time change in the level and the slope of the trend function of the series. Hence, to test 
for a unit root against the alternative of a one-time structural break, Zivot and 
Andrews use the following regression equation: 
 
  1
1
1,...,
k
tt t t j t j t
j
YY t D U D T d Y t T αβ θ γ ε −−
=
∆=+ Φ + + + + ∆ + = ∑ , (8) 
 
where DUt is an indicator dummy variable for a mean shift occurring at each possible 
break-date (TB), while DTt is the corresponding trend shift variable. Formally, DUt =1 
if t >TB and 0 otherwise; and DTt = t-TB if t >TB and 0 otherwise. The ∆Yt-j terms on 
the right-hand side of the above equation allow for serial correlation and ensure that 
the disturbance term is white noise. 
 
The null hypothesis of the test is Φ=0, which implies that the series Yt contains a unit 
root with a drift that excludes any structural break, while the alternative hypothesis 
Φ<0 implies that the series is a trend-stationary process with a one-time break 
occurring at an unknown point in time. The Zivot and Andrews method regards every 
point as a potential break-date (TB), and runs a regression for every possible break-
date sequentially. 
                                                 
16  In doing so, we do not consider structural break-dates as being exogenously determined, but we test 
endogenously for them, i.e. assuming the break-date to be unknown. We are grateful to J. Lee for 
providing us with the GAUSS codes (for the Zivot and Andrews and for the Lumsdaine and Papell 
tests) that we adjusted for our analysis, and which are available upon request. 
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In applying the Zivot and Andrews (1992) test, some region must be chosen such that 
the end points of the sample are not included, because in the presence of these end 
points, the asymptotic distribution of the statistics diverges to infinity. Zivot and 
Andrews suggest the “trimming region” [0.15, 0.85]. Among all possible break-points 
(TB), the procedure selects as its choice of break-date (TB
*) the date for which the 
ADF t-statistic (the absolute value of the t-statistic for Φ) is maximised. 
 
Although asymptotic critical values are available for this test, Zivot and Andrews 
warn that with small sample sizes (such as the one we are using for our fiscal 
sustainability analysis) the distribution of the test statistic can deviate substantially 
from its asymptotic distribution. To circumvent this distortion, ‘exact’ critical values 
for the test are computed following the methodology advocated in Zivot and Andrews 
(1992, p. 262).  
 
The results of the test by Zivot and Andrews (1992) together with exact critical values 
are reported in Tables C1, C2 and C3 of Appendix C, respectively for the first 
difference of the stock of government debt, government expenditure and government 
revenue series. The outcome clearly favours the non-stationary hypothesis. Indeed, at 
the five per cent level of significance the test allows the rejection of the unit root 
hypothesis in the stock of government debt for Finland and the UK, in general 
government expenditures only for Finland, France, Luxembourg, Portugal, and Spain, 
and cannot reject it in the general government revenues for all EU15 countries. 
 
A possible problem with the Zivot and Andrews (1992) test is the loss of power if 
there are two structural breaks in the series.
17 Lumsdaine and Papell (1997) explore 
this possibility by extending Zivot and Andrews’s models to allow for two 
endogenous breaks under the alternative hypothesis and additionally to accommodate 
for breaks in the level and the trend. Series are generally interpreted as broken trend 
stationary if the null unit root hypothesis is rejected in favour of the alternative of two 
breaks. More precisely, model C of Zivot and Andrews (1992), as used previously and 
                                                 
17 Besides, Lee and Strazicich (2003) suggest that spurious rejection problems may arise akin to that 
with Zivot and Andrews with a break under the null hypothesis.  
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extended by Lumsdaine and Papell (1997) (model CC, which allows for two breaks in 
the intercept and slope of the trend), is written as follows: 
 
  11 1 1 1 2 2 2 2
1
1,...,
k
tt jt j t tt t t
j
YY t D U D T D U D T d Y t T αβ θ γ θ γ ε − −
=
∆=+ Φ + + + + + + ∆ + = ∑ , (9) 
 
where  DU1t and DU2t are indicator dummy variables for a mean shift occurring 
respectively at time (TB1) and (TB2) with TB2 > TB1+ 2, while DT1t and DT2t are the 
corresponding trend shift variables. Formally, DU1t =1 if t >TB1 and 0 otherwise; and 
DU2t =1 if t >TB2 and 0 otherwise. In the same way, DT1t = t-TB1 if t >TB1 and 0 and 
otherwise; and DT2t = t-TB2 if t >TB2 and 0 and otherwise. As in the previous test, the 
∆Yt-j terms on the right-hand side of the above equation allow for serial correlation 
and ensure that the disturbance term is white noise. Note that the break points are 
chosen using the same approach as in the one break case, and that the critical values 
are generated as in the case of the Zivot and Andrews (1992) test. 
 
The Lumsdaine and Papell (1997) two-break test results are reported in Tables C1, C2 
and C3 of Appendix C, again respectively for the first difference of the stock of public 
debt, government expenditure, and government revenue. Here, two important results 
emerge. First, by allowing for two structural breaks it is not possible to reject the unit 
root null hypothesis in the general government expenditure as well as in the general 
government revenue series for all EU15 countries, at the five per cent level of 
significance. A similar result is obtained for the stock of public debt for most EU 
countries except Finland and Germany.  
 
Second, in the majority of cases the results of the Lumsdaine and Papell (1997) two-
break test are in accordance with those previously obtained with the Zivot and 
Andrews (1992) one-break test, which is a relatively satisfactory result. For instance, 
no statistically significant structural break can be detected by the two tests in the 
general government expenditures. The two tests are also able to detect a structural 
break for Finland and for the UK in the first difference of the stock of government 
debt, and the date break found is the same for Finland (1991). Of course, some 
diverging conclusions in the two tests’ diagnostics can be noted when one allows for 
two structural breaks in the series, in particular for the general government revenue  
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series for several EU15 countries. Finally, it may be relevant to note that the years 
selected as the break points for Finland and Germany in the government debt variable 
were 1991, a period closely related to an economic downturn in the former country, 
where the government stepped in to solve the banking crisis, and to reunification in 
the latter. 
 
4.3. First generation panel unit root tests (cross-country independence) 
 
In addition to the previous unit root tests applied to individual series, we have also 
carried out a set of panel data unit root test the robustness of the degree of integration 
of our series. In this sub-section, we implement more particularly the following panel 
data unit root tests (Breitung, 2000; Hadri, 2000; Im, Pesaran and Shin, 1997, 2003; 
Levin, Lin and Chu, 2002; Maddala and Wu, 1999; Choi, 2006; and Moon and 
Perron, 2004). Note that all tests except the last two are “first generation” panel data 
unit root tests. 
 
First, we used the test proposed by Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003, hereafter IPS), which 
has been widely implemented in empirical research due to its rather simple 
methodology and alternative hypothesis of heterogeneity. This test assumes cross-
sectional independence among panel units (except for common time effects), but 
allows for heterogeneity in the form of individual deterministic effects (constant 
and/or linear time trend), and heterogeneous serial correlation structure of the error 
terms. Tables 2, 3 and 4 report the results of the IPS test for the government debt, and 
for the revenue and expenditure ratio series. In order to facilitate comparisons, we 
also provide the results of five other panel unit root tests: Levin, Lin and Chu (2002), 
Breitung (2000), and Fisher-type tests using ADF and PP tests (Maddala and Wu, 
1999, hereafter MW; and Hadri, 2000). 
 
Concerning the first difference of the stock of government debt, the results given by 
the panel data unit root tests are more concomitant than those provided by the 
standard (individual) unit root ones. Indeed, at the five per cent level of significance, 
five panel data tests out of six (with the exception of the Hadri test) reveal that the 
null unit root hypothesis can be rejected at the five per cent level for EU15 countries 
(see Table 2), thus supporting the stationarity of the change in the stock of  
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government debt and hence the non-rejection of the solvency condition for the overall 
country sample.
18   
 
Table 2 – Summary of panel data unit root tests for the first difference of the stock of 
government debt, constant prices (1970-2006) 
 
Method Statistic  P-value*  Cross-sections  Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process) 
Levin, Lin & Chu t stat  -1.92991   0.0268   15   494 
Breitung t-stat  -2.99756   0.0014   15   479 
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat   -3.18952   0.0007   15   494 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square   58.7550   0.0013   15   494 
PP - Fisher Chi-square   77.9679   0.0000   15   509 
Null: No unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Hadri Z-stat   2.57067   0.0051   15   524 
* Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi-square distribution. All other tests 
assume asymptotic normality. 
Automatic selection of lags based on SIC. Newey-West bandwidth selection using a Bartlett kernel 
 
As far as the general government revue-to-GDP ratio is concerned, five panel data 
tests out of six (with the exception of the Breitung test) produce significant evidence 
in favour of their integration of order one for all EU15 countries at the 5 per cent level 
of significance (see Table 3). In other words, the non-stationarity of the revenue-to-
GDP ratio cannot be rejected. 
 
Table 3 – Summary of panel data unit root tests for general government revenue-to-
GDP ratios (1970-2006) 
 
Method Statistic  P-value*  Cross-sections  Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process) 
Levin, Lin & Chu stat  -0.77258   0.2199   15   534 
Breitung t-stat  -2.57515   0.0050   15   519 
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat    2.09943   0.9821   15   534 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square   20.8225   0.8934   15   534 
PP - Fisher Chi-square   20.1458   0.9127   15   537 
Null: No unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Hadri Z-stat   9.94807   0.0000   15   553 
* Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi-square distribution. All other tests 
assume asymptotic normality. 
Automatic selection of lags based on SIC. Newey-West bandwidth selection using a Bartlett kernel 
 
                                                 
18 A common feature of the panel tests mentioned above is that they maintained the null hypothesis of a 
unit root in all panel members (the only exception is the test by Hadri, 2000, whose null hypothesis is 
stationarity for all panel units). Therefore, their rejection decision actually indicates that at least one 
panel member is stationary, with no information about how many series or which ones are stationary. 
This possibility for a mixed panel implies that some of the members may be stationary while others 
may be non-stationary (see Taylor and Sarno, 1998 and Taylor, 2004 for further details).  
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Finally, and according to Table 4, the general government expenditure-to-GDP ratio 
also appears to have a unit root for all countries at the 5 per cent level of significance 
if one refers to the results of all panel data unit root tests. 
 
Table 4 – Summary of panel data unit root tests for general government expenditure-
to-GDP ratios (1970-2006) 
 
Method Statistic  P-value*  Cross-sections  Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process) 
Levin, Lin & Chu stat  -0.88260   0.1887   15   450 
Breitung t-stat  -1.53137   0.0628   15   435 
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat    2.61169   0.9955   15   450 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square   13.3435   0.9963   15   450 
PP - Fisher Chi-square   13.1161   0.9968   15   465 
Null: No unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Hadri Z-stat   10.6455   0.0000   15   480 
* Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi-square distribution. All other tests 
assume asymptotic normality. 
Automatic selection of lags based on SIC. Newey-West bandwidth selection using a Bartlett kernel 
 
However, as shown by several authors (notably O’Connell, 1998; and Banerjee, 
Marcellino and Osbat, 2004, 2005), the assumption of cross-sectional dependence 
limited to the case of common time effects on which the asymptotic results of the 
IPS's procedure relies (like most panel data unit root tests of “the first generation”, 
including Maddala and Wu, 1999; Levin, Lin and Chu, 2002; and more generally all 
previous six panel data unit-root tests) is often unrealistic and can be at odds with 
economic theory and empirical results. Besides, as shown in two simulation studies 
by Banerjee et al. (2004a, 2004b), if panel members are cross-correlated or even 
cross-sectionally cointegrated, all these tests experience strong size distortions and 
limited power This point is analytically confirmed by Lyhagen (2000) and Pedroni 
and Urbain (2001).  
 
4.4. Second generation panel unit root tests (cross-country dependence) 
 
As Breitung and Pesaran (2005) note, time series are contemporaneously correlated in 
many macroeconomic applications using country or regional data. Prominent 
examples of this are the analysis of purchasing power parity and output convergence 
(see for instance Pesaran, 2004). However, the literature on how to model cross-
sectional dependence in large panels is still developing. Cross-sectional dependence  
  24
can arise due to a variety of factors, such as omitted observed common factors, spatial 
spillover effects, for example via integrated financial markets, unobserved common 
factors, or general residual interdependence, all of which could remain even when all 
observed and unobserved common effects have been taken into account. In the EU 
context, some possible cross-country dependence can be envisaged in the presence of 
a similar policy measures (i.e. in the run-up to EMU), coupled with similar fiscal 
behaviour (e.g. pursuing fiscal consolidation in the run-up to EMU and within the 
SGP framework), and cross-country spillovers in government bond markets especially 
after the completion of the single EU15 capital market from 1994 (stage 2 of EMU). 
 
For this reason, various recent studies have proposed panel unit root tests allowing for 
more general forms of cross-sectional dependency, e.g. Choi (2006), Bai and Ng 
(2003), Moon and Perron (2004), Pesaran (2007) and Phillips and Sul (2003). We 
have decided to investigate the presence of a unit root using two second generation 
tests, namely Choi (2006) and Moon and Perron (2004), to whom we refer the reader 
for further details.
19 This last test in particular seems to show good size and power for 
different values of T and N and model specifications, according to the Monte Carlo 
experiments conducted by Gutierrez (2006).
20  
 
The results reported in Tables 5 and 6 indicate that the null unit root hypothesis 
cannot be rejected by the two tests at the 5 per cent level for the government 
expenditure and revenue ratios, but can be rejected for the government debt for all 
EU15 countries, which supports the initial results produced by the first generation 
panel data unit root tests. Furthermore, tests on the series in first differences confirm 
the hypothesis of stationarity for government expenditure and revenue ratios. 
Therefore, we may conclude that the general government revenue and expenditure-to-
GDP ratios expressed in level are integrated of order 1 for all EU15 countries, 
independently of the panel unit root tests considered, thereby demonstrating that the 
non-stationarity property of our revenue and expenditure series is a robust result. 
 
                                                 
19 Note that another possibility would be to use a procedure as the one advocated by Breuer et al. 
(2002) whereby unit root testing is conducted within a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) 
framework. An advantage of this procedure is that the SUR framework is another useful way of 
addressing cross-sectional dependency.  
20 We are grateful to C. Hurlin for making available his Matlab codes to us.  
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Table 5 – Results of Choi's (2006) test 
a (1970-2006) 
 
 P m statistic  Z statistic  L* statistic 
First difference of the stock of public debt  0.000      0.000  0.000 
General government revenue-to-GDP ratios  0.463  0.354  0.354 
General government expenditure-to-GDP ratios  0.364  0.382  0.373 
 
Note: All figures reported in the table are P-values. 
a - Note that the Pm test is a modification of Fisher’s (1932) inverse Chi-square tests, and rejects 
the null unit root hypothesis for positive large value of the statistics, and that the L
* is a logit test. 
The tests (Z and L
*) reject the null for large negative values of the statistics. The P, Z and L
* tests 
converge under the null to a standard normal distribution as (N, T →∞) (see Choi, 2006 for further 
details). 
 
Table 6 – Results of Moon and Perron's (2004) test 
a (1970-2006) 
 
  t*a t*b 
First difference of the stock of public debt  0.000      0.000 
General government revenue-to-GDP ratios  0.526  0.541 
General government expenditure-to-GDP ratios  0.382  0.434 
 
Note: All figures reported in the table are P-values. 
a - The null hypothesis of the two tests proposed by Moon and Perron (2004) is the unit root for 
all panel units. Under the null H0 , they show that for ( N, T →∞) with  N / T → 0, the statistics t*a 
and t*b have a standard normal distribution. 
 
4.5. Panel unit root tests allowing for structural breaks 
 
The presence of structural breaks in panel series data can induce behaviour similar to 
that of an integrated process, making it difficult to differentiate between a unit root 
and a stationary process with a regime shift. For this reason, the panel unit root tests 
in the previous section, such as the IPS and MW tests, may potentially suffer from a 
significant loss of power if structural breaks are present in the data.  
 
In this section, we employ the panel data unit root test based on the Lagrangian 
multiplier (LM) principle developed by Im and Lee (2001), which is very flexible 
since it can be applied not only when a structural break occurs at a different time 
period in each time series, but also when the structural break occurs in only some of 
the time series. The proposed test is not only robust to the presence of structural 
breaks, but is also more powerful than the popular IPS test in the basic scenario where 
no structural breaks are involved. Furthermore, as reported by Im and Lee (2001), 
since the LM test loses little power by controlling for spurious structural breaks when 
they do not exist, this represents a reasonable strategy to control for breaks even when  
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they are only at a suspicious level. Moreover, this panel LM test does not require the 
simulation of new critical values that depend on the number and location of breaks.
21  
 
In order to provide a robust analysis, we compare both univariate and panel LM unit 
root test results with and without a structural break. We begin with the Schmidt and 
Phillips (1992) univariate LM unit root test without any structural change. Then, we 
move to extensions that allow for one break, since our time series covers periods 
during which structural change may have occurred due to structural and institutional 
changes in the EU15 countries. In addition to the Schmidt and Phillips (1992) no-
break test, we employ the univariate test and the Lee and Strazicich (2003) minimum 
LM unit root tests with one break to determine the structural break point in each 
country. After determining the optimal break point, we employ the panel LM unit root 
test of Im and Lee (2001). For comparison, we also show the panel LM test results 
with no breaks.  
 
To determine the optimal break point in the panel LM test, we utilize the univariate 
minimum LM unit root tests of Lee and Strazicich (2003). These tests are comparable 
to the corresponding Dickey and Fuller-type endogenous break tests of Zivot and 
Andrews (1992). The performance of the LM test is comparable to or superior to 
these counterpart tests in terms of size and power. In addition, the LM unit root tests 
are not subject to spurious rejections under the null. In each test, the break point is 
determined endogenously from the data via a grid search by selecting the break where 
the value of the unit root test statistic is at its minimum. Using the minimum LM tests 
of Lee and Strazicich (2003), the unit root test statistic is estimated at each break 
point. The procedure is repeated over the time interval [0.1T, 0.9T] in order to 
eliminate end points, until the break is determined where the unit root t-test statistic is 
minimized. The optimal number of lags in each country is determined by sequentially 
examining the t-statistic for the last lag coefficient to see if it is significant at the 
approximate 5 per cent level in an asymptotic normal distribution. We begin with the 
one-break LM test. If less than one break is significant, we employ the no-break LM 
unit root test. The corresponding LM unit root test statistic is then chosen after 
                                                 
21 It should be noted that these tests assume cross-sectional independence among panel units.  
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determining the optimal break point. After determining the appropriate unit root test 
statistic for each country, the panel LM test statistic is then calculated.
22  
 
The results are reported in Tables 7, 8 and 9, which respectively show the first 
difference of the stock of government debt at 2000 constant prices, and general 
government expenditure and revenue taken as a percentage of GDP. For the univariate 
LM test with no break, the unit root null can be rejected at the 5 per cent level of 
significance in three countries for government debt (Austria, Greece and Italy), in two 
countries for government expenditure (Finland and the UK), and in two countries for 
government revenue (Denmark and Sweden). After allowing for a structural break, 
the univariate minimum LM test rejects the unit root null in four countries for 
government debt  (Austria, Denmark, France and Italy), in four countries for 
government expenditure (Finland, France, Italy and the Netherlands), and cannot 
reject it for government revenue at the 5 per cent level.  
 
Table 7 – Panel LM unit root tests allowing for structural break for the first difference 
of the stock of government debt (1970-2006) 
 
Country Individual  LM 
statistic 
without a break 
a 
Lags Individual  LM   
tatistic 
with a break 
b 
Lags Optimal  break 
point 
Austria -4.420*              7  -4.707*               7  2003 
Belgium  -2.246  8  -1.632               1  1995 
Denmark -2.288  2  -4.126*               7  2000 
Finland  -1.945  8  -2.456               3  1993 
France -2.997  3  -3.718*               4  1993 
Germany  -2.877  8  -3.075               8  1993 
Greece -3.213*  8  -2.099               8  2002 
Ireland  -1.444  2  -2.683               5  1995 
Italy -4.404*  7 -4.905*               7  2003 
Luxembourg  -1.449  5  -1.731               4  1997 
Netherlands  -0.487  3  -0.868               3  1992 
Portugal  -1.874  3  -2.132               3  2002 
Spain -1.599  1  -1.076    1  1993 
Sweden -2.129  1  -3.155  1  2000 
United Kingdom  -2.142 4  -2.169    4 2002 
Panel LM stat 
c  -3.126*               -5.077*                   
Notes: i) As all tests are one-sided, a calculated statistic smaller than the critical value leads to the rejection of the 
null of a unit root. At 5 per cent the critical value for the LM test without break is - 3.06. At 5 per cent the critical 
value for the minimum LM test with one break is - 3.566. 
ii) The critical value for the panel LM test (with or without breaks) is -1.645 with an asymptotic standard normal 
distribution. 
iii) * denotes significance at the 5 per cent level. 
a) Schmidt and Phillips (1992) test; b) Lee and Strazicich (2003) test; c) Im and Lee (2001) test. 
 
 
                                                 
22 We are grateful to J. Lee for providing us with the GAUSS codes, which we have adapted for our 
analysis, and that are available upon request.  
  28
Without allowing for structural breaks, the panel LM test statistic is -3.126 for the 
stock of real government debt series clearly indicating that the unit root null can be 
rejected at the 5 per cent level of significance, due to increased power from panel data 
(see Table 7). In addition, after allowing for structural breaks, the panel test statistic 
of -5.95 strongly rejects the unit root null at the 5 per cent level. These results clearly 
demonstrate the gain in power from combining structural breaks with panel data. 
Since the panel LM test statistic is calculated using the average test statistic of all 
countries, it is possible that the panel results are due to a small number of outliers 
having a relatively large impact.  
 
Examination of the univariate test statistics (with breaks) for each country reveals that 
Austria, Denmark, France and Italy might qualify as such an outlier, as they are the 
only four countries that reject the unit root null at the 5 per cent level. In order to see 
if our panel results are robust to a possible outlier effect, we therefore recalculated the 
panel LM test statistic (with breaks) omitting these four countries. The resulting panel 
test statistic of -3.62 continues to reject the unit root null at the 5 per cent level of 
significance, thus firmly supporting our hypothesis that the panel test results are not 
due to outliers. 
 
Concerning the general government expenditure and the revenue series taken as a 
percentage of GDP, it appears that the panel LM test statistics with or without a break 
cannot reject the null unit root hypothesis at the 5 per cent level of significance, thus 
providing strong evidence in favour of a unit root in these two EU15 country series.  
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Table 8 – Panel LM unit root tests allowing for structural break for general 
government revenue-to-GDP ratios (1970-2006) 
 
Country Individual  LM 
statistic 
without a break 
a 
Lags Individual  LM 
statistic 
with a break
 b 
Lags Optimal  break 
point 
Austria  -2.667               2  -2.957               2  1989 
Belgium  -1.627               3  -2.313               3  1990 
Denmark  -2.128               6  -2.467               6  1989 
Finland -3.901*              8  -3.806*               8  2001 
France  -3.063               4  -4.205*               6  1995 
Germany  -1.593               7  -2.492               8  1998 
Greece  -1.292               0  -1.443               0  1992 
Ireland  -0.916               5  -0.346               8  1997 
Italy  -2.284               8  -3.950*               8  1991 
Luxembourg  0.502               8   0.362               8  1992 
Netherlands  -2.070               2  -4.168*               8  1992 
Portugal  -1.674               0   0.105               8  1988 
Spain  -1.928     0  -1.577   8  1983 
Sweden -0.595  6  -0.811  8  1991 
United Kingdom  -3.156*  6 -2.141    5 1987 
Panel LM stat 
c  -0.292                 -1.62                     
Notes: i) As all tests are one-sided, a calculated statistic smaller than the critical value leads to the rejection of the 
null of a unit root. At 5 per cent  the critical value for the LM test without a break is - 3.06. At 5 per cent the 
critical value for the minimum LM test with one break is - 3.566. 
ii) The critical value for the panel LM test (with or without breaks) is -1.645 with an asymptotic standard normal 
distribution. 
iii) * denotes significance at the 5 per cent level. 
a) Schmidt and Phillips (1992) test; b) Lee and Strazicich (2003) test; c) Im and Lee (2001) test. 
 
Table 9 – Panel LM unit root tests allowing for structural break for general 
government expenditure-to-GDP ratios (1970-2006) 
 
Country Individual  LM 
statistic 
without a break 
a 
Lags Individual  LM 
statistic 
with a break 
b 
Lags Optimal  break 
point 
Austria  -1.627               3  -1.253               2  1981           
Belgium  -2.128               6  -1.855               6  1991 
Denmark -3.901*              8  -2.055               8  1985 
Finland  -3.063               4  -1.935               7  1981 
France  -1.593               7  -1.712               2  1993 
Germany  -1.292               0  -1.553               6  1993 
Greece  -0.916               5  -2.779               7  1994 
Ireland  -2.284               8  -1.487               7  1990 
Italy  0.502               8  -2.372               7  2000 
Luxembourg  -2.070               2   0.234               6  2003 
Netherlands  -1.674               0  -1.394               7  1985 
Portugal  -1.928               0  -1.966               8  2000 
Spain -0.595  6  -1.898  5  1986 
Sweden -3.156*  6 -1.203      1  1993 
United Kingdom  -1.411  2  -1.326  7  2000 
Panel LM stat 
c  0.212                 0.999                    
Notes: i) As all tests are one-sided, a calculated statistic smaller than the critical value leads to the rejection of the 
null of a unit root. At 5 per cent the critical value for the LM test without a break is - 3.06. At 5 per cent  the 
critical value for the minimum LM test with one break is - 3.566. 
ii) The critical value for the panel LM test (with or without breaks) is -1.645 with an asymptotic standard normal 
distribution. 
iii)) * denotes significance at the 5 per cent level. 
a) Schmidt and Phillips (1992) test; b) Lee and Strazicich (2003) test; c) Im and Lee (2001) test. 
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Overall, our findings using panel data unit root tests that allow for structural breaks 
support the previous results of first and second generation panel data unit root tests, 
leading us to conclude that the stock of government debt series is integrated of order 
zero (indicating that the solvency condition would be satisfied for the EU15 
countries), and that the general government expenditure and the revenue series are 
integrated of order one. These findings are summarized in Table 10. 
 
Table 10 – Summary of stationarity tests, 5 per cent level of significance 
(H0: unit root, non-stationarity, for most cases) 
 
Set of 
results 
1
st difference of stock of real government debt (2000 constant prices) 
1 Individual  unit  root 
tests 
ADF, no unit root: 
AT, FI, FR, UK, SW 
PP, no unit root:  
AT, IR, LU, SW 
2 Individual  unit  root 
tests, with breaks 
Zivot-Andrews (1992), no unit 
root: FI, UK 
Lumsdaine-Papell (1997), no 
unit root: FI, DE, UK 
3  Panel unit root 1
st 
generation tests, 
country independence 
Levin-Lin-Chu, Breitung, Im-Pesaran-Shin, ADF, PP: no unit 
root, stationarity. 
Hadri, unit root. 
4  Panel unit root 2
nd 
generation tests, 
country dependence 
Choi (2006): 
no unit root. 
Moon-Perron (2004): 
no unit root. 
5  Individual LM unit root 
tests 
Schmidt-Phillips (1992), no 
breaks, no unit root: AT, GR, 
IT 
Lee-Strazicich (2003), with 
breaks, no unit root: AT, DK, 
FR, IT 
6  Panel LM unit root tests  Im-Lee (2001), no breaks: no 
unit root. 
Im-Lee (2001), with breaks: no 
unit root. 
    General government revenue 
(% of GDP) 
General government 
expenditure (% of GDP) 
7 Individual  unit  root 
tests 
ADF, no unit root: AT, DE, 
LU, SW 
PP, no unit root: AT, FI, DE, 
LU, SW, UK 
ADF, no unit root: DE, UK 
PP, no unit root: DE, LU, PT, 
UK 
8  Panel unit root 1
st 
generation tests, 
country independence 
Levin-Lin-Chu, Im-Pesaran-
Shin, Hadri, ADF, PP: unit 
root, non-stationarity. 
Breitung, no unit root. 
Levin-Lin-Chu, Breitung, Im-
Pesaran-Shin, Hadri, ADF, PP: 
unit root, non-stationarity. 
9  Panel unit root 2
nd 
generation tests, 
country dependence 
Choi (2006) and Moon-Perron 
(2004): unit root. 
Choi (2006) and Moon-Perron 
(2004): unit root. 
10  Individual LM unit root 
tests 
Schmidt-Phillips (1992), no 
breaks, no unit root: FI, UK. 
Lee-Strazicich (2003), with 
breaks, no unit root: FI, FR, IT, 
NL. 
Schmidt-Phillips (1992), no 
breaks, no unit root: DK, SW. 
Lee-Strazicich (2003), with 
breaks, no unit root: reject for 
all countries. 
11  Panel LM unit root tests  Im-Lee (2001), no breaks: unit 
root. 
Im-Lee (2001), with breaks: 
unit root. 
 
Note: AT – Austria, DE – Germany, DK – Denmark, FI – Finland, FR – France, GR – Greece, IR – 
Ireland, IT – Italy, LU – Luxembourg, NL – Netherlands, PT – Portugal, SW – Sweden, UK – United 
Kingdom. 
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5. Cointegration between government expenditure and revenue ratios 
 
After having confirmed the non-stationarity of our series of government revenue and 
expenditure for the EU15 as a whole, in particular if one refers to the panel data unit 
root tests of the previous section, it is natural to test the existence of a structural long-
run relationship between both series. This is the procedure we use in this section to 
assess fiscal sustainability on the basis of the intertemporal budget constraint as given 
in (7).  
 
Compared to panel unit root tests, the analysis of cointegration in panels is still at an 
early stage of development. So far, the focus of the panel cointegration literature has 
been on residual-based approaches, although there have been a number of attempts to 
develop system approaches as well. As is the case for panel unit root tests, panel 
cointegration tests are based on homogeneous and heterogeneous alternatives. The 
residual-based tests were developed to ward against the spurious regression problem 
that can arise in panels when dealing with I(1) variables. Such tests are appropriate 
when it is a priori known that at most there can be only one within-group 
cointegration in the panel. Notable contributions to this strand of the literature include 
Kao (1999), Pedroni (1999, 2000, 2004), and more recently Westerlund and Edgerton 
(2007) and Westerlund (2005, 2007). System approaches are required in more general 
settings where more than one within-group cointegrating relation might be present, 
and/or unobserved common I(1) factors exist. Recent contributions in this area 
include the work of Larsson, Lyhagen and Lothgren (2001), Groen and Kleibergen 
(2003) and Breitung (2005), who has generalized the likelihood approach introduced 
in Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1999). 
 
The computation of the Pedroni test statistics assumes cross-sectional independence 
across individual units (apart from common time effects), an assumption that, as we 
have already mentioned, is probably absent for many macroeconomic time series. To 
take into account the possible cross-sectional dependence when carrying out the 
cointegration analysis, we decided to compute the bootstrap distribution of Pedroni’s 
test statistics, thereby generating data-specific critical values. As in Banerjee and 
Carrion-i-Silvestre (2006), we have of course not used the seven statistics proposed 
by Pedroni (1999, 2004) to test the null hypothesis of no cointegration using single  
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equation methods based on the estimation of static regressions. These statistics can 
also be grouped into either parametric or non-parametric statistics, depending on the 
way that autocorrelation and endogeneity bias are accounted for. In our study, we are 
only concerned with the parametric version of the statistics, i.e. the normalized bias 
and the pseudo t-ratio statistics, and with the ADF test statistics in particular. These 
test statistics are defined by pooling the individual tests, so that they belong to the 
class of between-dimension test statistics (see Pedroni, 1999, 2004 for further details).  
 
As Banerjee and Carrion-i-Silvestre (2006) stress, some caution is required 
concerning the method used to bootstrap cointegration relationships, since not all 
available procedures lead to consistent estimates. In this regard, we have followed 
Phillips (2001), Park (2002) and Chang, Park and Song (2006) in using a modified 
version of the sieve bootstrap described in Banerjee et al. (2006).
23 
 
Table 11 reports the results of the panel data cointegration tests developed by Pedroni 
(1999, 2004) both using conventional (asymptotic) critical values (as per Pedroni, 
1999) and bootstrap critical values. We present the results for the entire sample 
period, 1970-2006, and for two sub-periods, 1970-1991 and 1992-2006, in order to 
assess whether different fiscal realities and behaviour can be detected for more recent 
years in the EU, notably after the signing of the Maastricht Treaty with the setting up 
of the fiscal convergence criteria. 
 
For the period 1970-2006, using conventional asymptotic critical values (-1.65 at 5 
per cent) calculated under the assumption of cross-sectional independence (reported in 
Pedroni, 1999, and extracted from the standard normal distribution), the null 
hypothesis of no cointegration between government revenue and expenditure ratios is 
always rejected by the test statistics, irrespective of whether the model includes a 
constant or a linear trend. However, if we consider bootstrap critical values (which are 
valid if there is some dependence among individuals), the conclusions of the test are 
less straightforward, and instead crucially depend on the level of significance chosen. 
Indeed, at the 10 per cent level of significance, the null hypothesis of no cointegration 
is still rejected by the data, but an opposite result is obtained at the 5 per cent level of 
                                                 
23 We are grateful to A. Banerjee and J. Carrion-i-Silvestre for providing us with their GAUSS codes 
(for a detailed discussion of the method used, see the end of the paper).  
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significance for a model including either a constant or a linear trend. Finally, retaining 
a 10 per cent level of significance, we conclude that a long-run relationship exists 
between government revenue and expenditure for the set of EU15 countries, whatever 
the specification of the deterministic component. 
 
Table 11 – Panel cointegration test results between government revenue and 
expenditure (Pedroni, 1999; 2004) 
 
 
Period 1970-2006 
ADF-
stat    
P-value Bootstrap  distribution   
  1%     5%     10% 
Model with no deterministic component  -4.38  0.00  -4.88   -4.01  -3.52 
Model with a constant term  -3.19  0.00  -4.25   -3.31  -2.82 
Model including a time trend  -4.04  0.00  -5.62   -4.70  -4.03 
 
Period 1970-1991 
    
  1%     5%     10% 
Model with no deterministic component  -5.93  0.00  -7.63   -6.31  -5.63 
Model with a constant term  -7.38  0.00  -6.68   -5.40  -4.72 
Model including a time trend  -3.50  0.00  -7.56   -6.69  -5.09 
 
Period 1992-2006 
    
  1%     5%     10% 
Model with no deterministic component  -2.93  0.00  -6.78   -5.53  -4.87 
Model with a constant term  -1.79  0.03  -7.78   -6.32  -5.62 
Model including a time trend  -5.79  0.00  -9.22   -7.76  -6.98 
 
Notes:  
i) – The bootstrap is based on 2000 replications. 
ii) – As the tests are one-sided, a calculated statistic smaller than the critical value leads to the 
rejection of the null hypothesis of no cointegration.  
 
We then investigated the robustness of the previous results, implementing panel data 
cointegration tests for the two sub-periods 1970-1991 and 1992-2006. The results are 
easier to interpret and provide econometric elements that justify this split on the basis 
of economic and institutional grounds, as two different types of behaviour now 
emerge from the cointegration tests (see Table 11).  
 
First, concerning the 1970-1991 period, if one considers a model with a constant term, 
a statistical cointegration relationship clearly exists between government revenue and 
expenditure ratios, irrespective of whether one considers the (asymptotic) p-value or 
bootstrap critical values at 1, 5 or 10 per cent. The opposite result is however obtained 
for a model including a time trend, independently of the critical values used 
(asymptotic or bootstrap). Finally, intermediate results are obtained for a model with 
no deterministic component, for which a long-run statistical relationship between  
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government revenue and expenditure ratios only exists with the 10% bootstrap critical 
value.  
 
Second, the results do not seem to confirm the existence of a cointegration 
relationship for the period 1992-2006 between government revenue and expenditure 
ratios in the EU15 panel data set. This result is valid for any specification of the 
deterministic component considered, and is robust to the critical value used 
(asymptotic or bootstrap) for the conventional levels of significance. In this context, 
we should recall that after the beginning of the new millennium, the EU faced an 
economic recession (mirroring the beginning of the 1990s), with several countries 
entering into an Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) situation within the fiscal 
framework of the SGP. The reason why some countries faced an EDP depended, to 
some extent, on the difficulties encountered in implementing sound fiscal policies in 
“good times” and thus the lack of budgetary manoeuvre in the recession period. Such 
developments may explain the different results regarding fiscal sustainability obtained 
in our analysis for this more recent period. 
 
In order to assess the robustness of our findings, we also implemented the  bootstrap 
panel cointegration test proposed by Westerlund and Edgerton (2007). Unlike the 
panel data cointegration tests of Pedroni (1999, 2004), here the null hypothesis is now 
cointegration. This new test relies on the popular Lagrange multiplier test of 
McCoskey and Kao (1998), and permits correlation to be accommodated both within 
and between the individual cross-sectional units. In addition, the bootstrap suggested 
by Westerlund and Edgerton (2007) is based on the sieve-sampling scheme, and has 
the appealing advantage of significantly reducing the distortions of the asymptotic 
test.
24 The results reported in Table 12 for a model including either a constant term or 
a linear trend clearly indicate the absence of a cointegrating relationship between 
government revenue and expenditure since with an asymptotic p-value of 0.00, the 
null hypothesis of cointegration is always rejected. This result is only marginally 
modified if one refers to the bootstrap critical value, indicating that for a significant 
level higher than 2 per cent, the null hypothesis is still rejected. Hence at the 
conventional 5 and 10 per cent levels of significance, we can conclude that there is no 
                                                 
24 We are grateful to J. Westerlund for making available his GAUSS codes to us.  
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cointegrating relationship between government revenue and expenditure for the EU15 
panel data set.  
 
Interestingly, performing the panel data cointegration tests for the two sub-periods 
1970-1991 and 1992-2006 produces strong evidence in favour of the existence of a 
cointegration relationship between government revenue and expenditure ratios for the 
model with a constant term, with bootstrap p-values of 44% for the period 1970-1991, 
and 16% for the period 1992-2006. Hence, the necessary condition for public finance 
sustainability, i.e. the existence of a cointegration relationship between government 
revenue  and expenditure, seems to be verified for the two sub-periods using this 
bootstrap panel cointegration test. 
 
Table 12 – Panel cointegration test results between government revenue and 
expenditure (Westerlund and Edgerton, 2007) 
a 
 
 
Period 1970-2006 
LM-stat     Asymptotic  
p-value 
Bootstrap  
p-value 
Model with a constant term  7.08  0.00  0.02 
Model including a time trend  3.90  0.00  0.02 
 
Period 1970-1991 
    
Model with a constant term  0.63  0.26  0.44 
Model including a time trend  2.10  0.01  0.02 
 
Period 1992-2006 
    
Model with a constant term  1.37  0.08  0.16 
Model including a time trend  3.22  0.00  0.19 
 
Note: the bootstrap is based on 2000 replications. 
a) - The null hypothesis of the tests is cointegration between government revenue and 
expenditure.  
 
We further investigated whether public finances were sustainable for the model 
including a constant term, following the methodology of Pedroni (2004) and using a t-
statistic to test whether the panel cointegration coefficient of the general government 
expenditure-to-GDP ratios is equal to one or not in the cointegrating regression where 
the government revenue-to-ratio is the dependent variable. For the period 1970-2006, 
the calculated t-statistic of 5.03 is above the tabulated critical values extracted from 
the normal distribution (1.96 and 2.33 respectively at the 5 per cent and 1 per cent 
levels of significance). The confidence interval for this coefficient, at the 5 per cent 
level of significance, is [1.023; 1.136], which confirms that the value of the  
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coefficient is likely to be higher than one. For the two sub-periods, the 5 per cent 
confident intervals for the coefficient are respectively [0.868; 1.072] for the period 
1970-1991, and [0.678; 0.841] for the period 1992-2006. This therefore indicates that 
the coefficient in the cointegration relation is likely to be equal to one for the period 
1970-1991, which provides evidence of the sustainability of public finances in that 
period. 
 
Finally, we also tested, along the lines of MacDonald (1992), the possibility of 
cointegration between the primary balance ratio and the government debt-to-GDP 
ratio, which represents a possible avenue for assessing the sustainability of public 
finances, provided that both series are I(1) processes.  However, the panel unit root 
tests for those series, as reported in Appendix D, show that while the government 
debt-to-GDP ratio is indeed I(1), the primary balance ratio is I(0), which thus 
excludes the possibility of the existence of a cointegration relationship between these 
two series.
25 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
This paper has drawn on recent advances in the econometrics of non-stationary panel 
data methods to assess the sustainability of public finances for the EU15 countries in 
the period 1970-2006. Starting from the present value borrowing constraint of 
governments, we investigate past fiscal data to see if the stock of real government 
debt follows a stationary process, or if there is cointegration between government 
revenue and government expenditure as a percentage of GDP. 
 
The econometric methods used in the paper to assess the sustainability of public 
finances in the EU15 rest upon (i) individual unit root tests allowing in some cases for 
structural breaks; (ii) first generation panel data integration tests that assume cross-
sectional independence among panel units (apart from common time effects); (iii) two 
second generation panel data unit root tests that relax the assumption of cross-
sectional independence; (iv) panel data unit root tests that enable to accommodate 
structural breaks, and (v) the panel data cointegration tests developed by Pedroni 
                                                 
25 Similar results, not reported here, are obtained with the implementation of the panel data tests of the 
second generation by Moon and Perron, 2004 and Choi (2006).  
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(1999, 2004) and generalized by Banerjee and Carrion-i-Silvestre (2006), and  the 
bootstrap panel cointegration test by Westerlund and Edgerton (2007). 
 
The results from these panel unit root tests, allowing for structural breaks, support the 
results of both the first and second generation panel data unit root tests, leading us to 
conclude that the first difference of the stock of real government debt series is 
integrated of order zero, thus indicating that the solvency condition would be satisfied 
for EU15 countries, which is a necessary condition for fiscal policy sustainability. 
Moreover, our results also show that general government expenditure and revenue 
ratios are integrated of order one.  
 
Even if the results of the analysis may question fiscal sustainability in some cases 
when taken individually, it is nevertheless true that the tests point to the  solvency of 
government public finances when considering the EU15 panel data set. Naturally, this 
is an obvious advantage of the panel approach, since the time series dimension of the 
data is not that long for individual countries. Even if there is no single fiscal policy in 
the EU, the panel sustainability of public finances indicated by our results is relevant 
in a context of EU countries seeking to pursue sound fiscal policy behaviour within 
the Stability and Growth Pact framework. Nevertheless, what we can also conclude 
from our analysis is that for some particular cases sustainability will not be attained if 
past fiscal behaviour is to be kept unchanged in the future. For instance, and as we 
saw, the solvency condition, on the basis of the stationarity tests of government debt, 
was satisfied for roughly half of the 15 EU countries: Austria, Finland, France, 
Germany, the Netherlands, the UK and Sweden. This set of countries is even smaller 
once we take into account the existence of structural breaks in the series. 
 
Interestingly, the panel cointegration results for the entire 1970-2006 period allow us 
to draw the conclusion that a long-run relationship does exist between general 
government revenue and expenditure ratios for the set of EU15 countries, at least at 
the 10 per cent level of significance, both using conventional (asymptotic) critical 
values given in Pedroni (1999), and bootstrap panel cointegration proposed by 
Westerlund and Edgerton (2007). Moreover, this conclusion holds for the two sub-
periods, 1970-1991 and 1992-2006 (broadly before and after the Maastricht Treaty), 
for most of the cointegration tests carried out.  
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Naturally, one has to stress that in this paper we assessed fiscal sustainability taking 
into account the stock of explicit government debt, and also via the analysis of 
cointegration relationships between the flows of government expenditures and 
revenues. Other aspects, outside the scope of analysis of the paper, and which are also 
relevant for the sustainability of public finances, are on the one hand the existence of 
implicit government liabilities, and on the other hand population ageing in 
combination with insufficiently funded public pension schemes that may endanger 
fiscal sustainability in the future.  
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Appendix A. Data sources 
Original series 
 
AMECO codes * 
Gross domestic product, at current market prices, national currency 
 
.1.0.0.0.UVGD 
Gross domestic product, at 2000 market prices, national currency 
 
.1.1.0.0.OVGD 
General government consolidated gross debt, Excessive Deficit Procedure 
(based on ESA 1995) and former definition (linked series) (% of GDP) 
.1.0.319.0.UDGGL 
.1.0.319.0.UDGGF 
General government debt (level)  .1.0.0.0.UDGGL 
.1.0.0.0.UDGGF 
General government total expenditure (% of GDP)  .1.0.319.0.UUTGE 
.1.0.319.0.UUTGF 
General government total revenue (% of GDP)  .1.0.319.0.URTG 
.1.0.319.0.URTGF 
General government interest payments (% of GDP)  .1.0.319.0.UYIG 
.1.0.319.0.UYIGF 
Note: * series from the European Commission AMECO database (updated on 04/05/2007).  45
Appendix B. Standard individual unit root test results
  
 
 
 
Table B1 – Stationarity tests for the first difference of the stock of government debt with constant (at 2000 prices) 
a 
 
     ADF  PP 
b  KPSS ERS  NG-PERRON 
c 
Country 
 
 
Period 
 
Lags 
 
P value 
 
P value 
for 
Adj t-Stat 
 
LM-Statistic  
for level 
stationarity 
d 
       
Austria  1970-2006  2  0.0014  0.0104  0.514653    1.485594  -12.3621  -2.48100 0.20069 2.00192 
Belgium  1970-2006  1  0.4105  0.4384  0.213485      5.969791 -4.63482  -1.50390 0.32448 5.32258 
Denmark  1971-2006  1  0.4656  0.4012  0.370990    4.412965  -6.79899  -1.58747 0.23349 4.43042 
Finland  1970-2006  2  0.0104  0.1365  0.171744    1.016047  -24.0726  -3.46576 0.14397 1.02967 
France  1977-2006  3  0.0106  0.1082  0.401339      0.886443 -7.93293  -1.96910 0.24822 3.17086 
Germany  1970-2006  1  0.0516  0.0582  0.414604    3.104104  -10.0108  -2.22845 0.22260 2.48166 
Greece  1970-2006  2  0.8076  0.2683  0.624108    28.58263  -0.86369  -0.52257 0.60504 20.4395 
Ireland  1970-2006  2  0.3293  0.0005  0.216461    5.823934  -4.48445  -1.49703 0.33383 5.46400 
Italy  1970-2006  1  0.4311  0.4207  0.326493    10.59323  -3.18130  -1.14895 0.36116 7.54889 
Luxembourg  1970-2006  2  0.6856  0.0050  0.510071    16.06996  9.36789 1.96072 0.20930 14.5379 
Netherlands  1975-2006  1  0.0695  0.0640  0.275236    2.425800  -10.8222  -2.27744 0.21044 2.45088 
Portugal  1973-2006  1  0.2117  0.2835  0.621288    5.408992  -7.64496  -1.68737 0.22072 4.11891 
Spain  1970-2006  1  0.1552  0.1530  0.257055    3.582032  -7.97205  -1.96187 0.24609 3.20160 
Sweden  1970-2006  1  0.0480  0.0433  0.102106      2.282042 -11.6127  -2.37962 0.20492 2.22602 
United  Kingdom  1970-2006 3  0.0007  0.2068   0.224438      1.988533  -16.7307  -2.78151  0.16625  1.86568 
 
a – Note that the null hypothesis of all tests is that the considered series has a unit root except for the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin test, where it is stationarity around a constant. The lag 
length in the ADF regression is based on the Schwartz Information Criterion with a maximum lag of 9. 
b – Bandwidth: Newey-West using a Bartlett kernel. 
c – 
                MZa            MZt             MSB            MPT
Critical values:  1%  -13.8 -2.58 0.17 1.78
 5%  -8.10 -1.98 0.23 3.17
 10%  -5.70 -1.62 0.27 4.45
Lag length: Spectral GLS-detrended AR based on the Schwartz Information Criterion with a maximum lag of 9. 
d – The critical values provided by Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (1992, Table 1) are respectively 0.739 (1 per cent level), 0.463 (5 per cent level) and 0.347 (10 per cent level) for the LM 
test for level stationarity. 
e – The critical values extracted from Elliott-Rothenberg-Stock (1996, Table 1) are respectively 1.87 (1 per cent level), 2.97 (5 per cent level) and 3.91 (10 per cent level). Note that as it is a 
one-sided unit root test, with the alternative H1:ρ<1, a calculated statistic smaller than the tabulated critical value will lead to the rejection of the null H1:ρ=1.  46
Table B2 – Stationarity tests for government revenues with constant (percent of GDP) 
a 
 
 
     ADF  PP 
b  KPSS ERS  NG-PERRON
 c 
Country 
 
 
Period 
 
Lags 
 
P value 
 
P value 
for 
Adj t-Stat  
 
LM-Statistic  
for level 
stationariy 
d 
       
Austria 1970-2006  0  0.0416  0.0461  0.481611    82.42092  -0.54676  -0.45836  0.83832  36.0130 
Belgium 1970-2006  0  0.0871  0.7574  0.688033    49.86760 -0.84923  -0.56183  0.66158  23.1942 
Denmark 1971-2006  2    0.5809  0.3288  0.615298    53.90938  -0.62071  -0.41985  0.67640  25.3609 
Finland 1970-2006  0  0.1384  0.0320  0.602118    56.88679  -0.56931  -0.40385  0.70936  27.5648 
France  1977-2006  0  0.2649  0.2874  0.627758        143.0834      -0.550  0.55602  1.01094  64.5458 
Germany 1970-2006  0  0.0104  0.0116  0.250752    29.50308  -2.10129  -1.00725  0.47935  11.4929 
Greece  1970-2006  0    0.8580  0.8447  0.671432    109.2311  0.03749 0.02851 0.76040 35.4385 
Ireland 1970-2006  0  0.4052  0.3947  0.282870    17.05027  -2.06819  -0.99790  0.48250  11.6596 
Italy  1970-2006  1    0.6334  0.6358  0.660573    104.7556  0.34064 0.34222 1.00466 60.9516 
Luxembourg  1970-2006  1    0.0326  0.0155  0.468933    49.88170  0.34083 1.21833 3.57456 692.068 
Netherlands 1975-2006  1  0.2414  0.2264  0.201091    29.97768  -1.40949 -0.83491  0.59235  17.2672 
Portugal  1973-2006  2  0.7474  0.7953  0.716110    279.0827  0.84760 0.78794 0.92961 59.1332 
Spain 1970-2006  1  0.2669  0.3457  0.650818    287.1239  -1.15793  -0.55955  0.48323  14.5698 
Sweden 1970-2006  1  0.0865  0.0166  0.514078    42.52085 -1.02022  -0.61825  0.60599  19.7016 
United Kingdom  1970-2006  1  0.0148  0.0171  0.081815    4.850811  -7.97068  -1.99555  0.25036  3.07668 
 
a – Note that the null hypothesis of all tests is that the considered series has a unit root except for the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin test, where it is stationarity around a constant. The lag 
length in the ADF regression is based on the Schwartz Information Criterion with a maximum lag of 9. 
b – Bandwidth: Newey-West using a Bartlett kernel. 
c – 
                MZa            MZt             MSB            MPT
Critical values:  1%  -13.8 -2.58 0.17 1.78
 5%  -8.10 -1.98 0.23 3.17
 10%  -5.70 -1.62 0.27 4.45
Lag length: Spectral GLS-detrended AR based on the Schwartz Information Criterion with a maximum lag of 9. 
d – The critical values provided by Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (1992, Table 1) are respectively 0.739 (1 per cent level), 0.463 (5 per cent level) and 0.347 (10 per cent level) for the LM 
test for level stationarity. 
e – The critical values extracted from Elliott-Rothenberg-Stock (1996, Table 1) are respectively 1.87 (1 per cent level), 2.97 (5 per cent level) and 3.91 (10 per cent level). Note that as it is a 
one-sided unit root test, with the alternative H1:ρ<1, a calculated statistic smaller than the tabulated critical value will lead to the rejection of the null H1:ρ=1.  47
Table B3 – Stationarity tests for government expenditures with constant (percent of GDP)
 a 
 
 
     ADF  PP 
b  KPSS ERS  NG-PERRON
 c 
Country 
 
 
Period 
 
Lags 
 
P value 
 
P value 
for 
Adj t-Stat  
 
LM-Statistic  
for level 
stationarity 
d 
        
Austria  1970-2006  0  0.0590    0.0816  0.412088   74.40395  -0.62648  -0.51475 0.82166 34.1304 
Belgium 1970-2006  2   0.2681   0.1980  0.167964    13.33629  -3.74537  -1.36833 0.36534 6.54146 
Denmark  1971-2006  1  0.3221    0.2106  0.446637   25.34413  -1.94339  -0.96343 0.49575 12.3474 
Finland  1970-2006  1  0.2525    0.3533  0.518290   12.86527  -2.53376  -1.07174 0.42298 9.40257 
France  1977-2006  5  0.3261    0.2434  0.628887   250.1467  -0.47147  -0.28933 0.61368 22.8458 
Germany  1970-2006  0  0.0155    0.0151  0.240678   26.51387  -2.24493  -1.02856 0.45817 10.6777 
Greece  1970-2006  0  0.4561    0.4232  0.240678   75.70858  -0.20703  -0.19007 0.91808 45.7349 
Ireland  1970-2006  1  0.5114    0.5985  0.640310   7.403980  -3.76424  -1.35503 0.35997 6.51600 
Italy  1970-2006  0    0.1620    0.1862  0.233897   72.26970  -0.29061  -0.23057 0.79340 35.1634 
Luxembourg  1970-2006  1  0.1788    0.0080  0.424445   30.89793  -1.11555  -0.55193 0.49476 15.0782 
Netherlands  1975-2006  1  0.4848    0.4668  0.200853   11.97715  -2.86158  -1.19209 0.41658 8.54979 
Portugal  1973-2006  0    0.2739    0.0104  0.675697   128.6005  0.66476 0.61917 0.93142 57.1760 
Spain  1970-2006  1  0.3786    0.2850  0.539324   71.11501  -2.14546  -0.95815 0.44659 10.7549 
Sweden  1970-2006  1  0.1732   0.1886   0.381379    14.59689  -3.44981  -1.29807  0.37627  7.09510 
United Kingdom  1970-2006  2  0.0184   0.0711  0.080455    0.477187  -62.4567  -5.55697  0.08897  0.46388 
 
a – Note that the null hypothesis of all tests is that the considered series has a unit root except for the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin test, where it is stationarity around a constant. The lag 
length in the ADF regression is based on the Schwartz Information Criterion with a maximum lag of 9. 
b – Bandwidth: Newey-West using a Bartlett kernel. 
c – 
                MZa            MZt             MSB            MPT
Critical values:  1%  -13.8 -2.58 0.17 1.78
 5%  -8.10 -1.98 0.23 3.17
 10%  -5.70 -1.62 0.27 4.45
Lag length: Spectral GLS-detrended AR based on the Schwartz Information Criterion with a maximum lag of 9. 
d – The critical values provided by Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (1992, Table 1) are respectively 0.739 (1 per cent level), 0.463 (5 per cent level) and 0.347 (10 per cent level) for the LM 
test for level stationarity. 
e – The critical values extracted from Elliott-Rothenberg-Stock (1996, Table 1) are respectively 1.87 (1 per cent level), 2.97 (5 per cent level) and 3.91 (10 per cent  level). Note that as it is a 
one-sided unit root test, with the alternative H1:ρ<1, a calculated statistic smaller than the tabulated critical value will lead to the rejection of the null H1:ρ=1  48
  
Appendix C. Results of individual unit root tests with breaks  
 
 
Table C1 – Tests for structural change in the first difference of the stock of government debt 
with constant, at 2000 prices (Innovational Outlier Model)  
 
                          ZIVOT and ANDREWS (1992)  LUMSDAINE and PAPELL (1997) 
 
Country 
 
 
Period 
 
Lags 
 
Break 
date 
TB 
 
ADF
a 
break 
point test 
 
Lags 
 
 
Break 
date
b 
TB1 
 
Break 
date
c 
       TB2 
 
ADF break 
point test
d 
Austria 1970-2006  8  1991  -5.45  8  1992  2002 -6.08 
Belgium 1970-2006  7  1992  -5.66 7  1990  1992  -4.66 
Denmark 1971-2006  1  1997  -3.50  1  1997  2003  -2.84 
Finland 1970-2006  3  1991**  -8.47
# # #  1 1991** 2003**  -12.67
# # # 
France 1977-2006  4  1982  -3.09  7  1982  1993 -5.35 
Germany 1970-2006  5  1991  -4.52  7  1991**  1994**  -8.57
# # 
Greece 1970-2006  6  1988  -3.76  7  1990  1992 -4.18 
Ireland 1970-2006  2  1992  -3.82  1  1982  1987 -4.85 
Italy 1970-2006  8  1991  -5.03  8  1991  2002  -5.95 
Luxembourg 1970-2006  7  1986  -5.12  3  1987 2002  -2.55 
Netherlands 1975-2006  7  1993  -4.13  7  1996 1999  -6.51 
Portugal 1973-2006  6  2001  -4.71 6  1989  2001  -5.55 
Spain 1970-2006  8  1987  -3.46  8  1987  1992  -7.36 
Sweden 1970-2006  2  1990  -5.25 7  1990  2001  -740 
United Kingdom  1970-2006  3  1987**  -7.12
# # #  3 1991  2002  -7.05
# 
 
a – The ‘exact’ critical values are calculated based on 7,000 replications of a Monte Carlo simulation as described in 
Zivot and Andrews (1992, p. 262) and are respectively -6.68 (1 per cent level), -5.82 (5 per cent level) and -5.37 (10 per 
cent  level). 
b – ** denotes statistical significance of the first structural break at the 5 per cent level of significance. 
c – ** denotes statistical significance of the second structural break at the 5 per cent level of significance. 
d - The ‘exact’ critical values are calculated based on 7,000 replications of a Monte Carlo simulation as described in Lumsdaine and 
Papell (1997), and are respectively -8.78 (1 per cent  level), -7.47 (5 per cent  level), and -6.98 (10 per cent level). 
# 
 , 
# #
 , 
# # #
  denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent  levels of significance respectively. 
** denotes statistical significance of the structural break at the 5 per cent level of significance.  
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Table C2 – Tests for structural change in government revenues with constant 
(as a percentage of GDP) 
 
                          ZIVOT and ANDREWS (1992)  LUMSDAINE and PAPELL (1997) 
 
Country 
 
 
Period 
 
Lags 
 
Break 
date 
TB 
 
ADF
a 
break 
point test 
 
Lags 
 
 
Break 
date 
TB1 
 
Break 
date 
       TB2 
 
ADF break 
point test
b 
Austria 1970-2006  0  1983  -2.68 7  1986  1992  -4.96 
Belgium 1970-2006  7  1988  -3.70  4  1981  1995  -4.27 
Denmark 1971-2006  0  1983  -3.62  1  1983  1989  -3.61 
Finland 1970-2006  4  1993**  -7.03
# # #  4  1981 1989  -4.52 
France 1977-2006  6  1986**  -6.85
# # #  8 1992  2000  -5.45 
Germany 1970-2006  7  1985  -3.59  2  1991  2000  -5.27 
Greece 1970-2006  8  1988  -3.69 8  1986  1996  -4.71 
Ireland 1970-2006  6  1990  -5.06  6  1982  1986  -4.39 
Italy 1970-2006  2  1994  -4.10  7  1989  2001  -3.64 
Luxembourg 1970-2006  4  1987**  -5.89
# #  4  1985 1997  -6.16 
Netherlands 1975-2006  2  1981  -2.94  5  1988  1997  -6.47 
Portugal 1973-2006  1  1990**  -6.66
# #  1  1982 1990  -5.81 
Spain 1970-2006  8  1991**  -7.35
# # #  1  1994 2000  -4.18 
Sweden 1970-2006  1  1984  -4.17  1  1991 2001  -7.09 
# 
United Kingdom  1970-2006  7  1981  -4.66  1  1981  2001  -5.52 
a – The ‘exact’ critical values are calculated based on 7,000 replications of a Monte Carlo simulation as described in 
Zivot and Andrews (1992, p. 262) and are respectively -6.68 (1 per cent level), -5.82 (5 per cent level) and -5.37 (10 per 
cent level). 
b – ** denotes statistical significance of the first structural break at the 5 per cent level of significance. 
c – ** denotes statistical significance of the second structural break at the 5 per cent level of significance. 
d - The ‘exact’ critical values are calculated based on 7,000 replications of a Monte Carlo simulation as described in Lumsdaine and 
Papell (1997), and are respectively -8.78 (1 per cent  level), -7.47 (5 per cent  level), and -6.98 (10 per cent level). 
# 
 , 
# #
 , 
# # #
  denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent  levels of significance respectively. 
** denotes statistical significance of the structural break at the 5 per cent level of significance. 
 
Table C3 – Tests for structural change in government expenditures with constant  
(as a percentage of GDP) 
 
                          ZIVOT and ANDREWS (1992)  LUMSDAINE and PAPELL (1997) 
 
Country 
 
 
Period 
 
Lags 
 
Break 
date 
TB 
 
ADF
a 
break 
point test 
 
Lags 
 
 
Break 
date 
TB1 
 
Break 
date 
       TB2 
 
ADF break 
point test
b 
Austria 1970-2006  4  1986  -3.61  8  1986  1999  -4.59 
Belgium 1970-2006  1  1981  -3.76  1  1981  1994  -6.12 
Denmark 1971-2006  1  1989  -3.03  3  1987  1993  -3.09 
Finland 1970-2006  1  1989  -5.65  4  1989  1997  -6.42 
France 1977-2006  3  1992  -3.37  8  1981  1992  -4.65 
Germany 1970-2006  4  1991  -5.09  4  1991  1994  -5.23 
Greece 1970-2006  0  1986  -3.82  1  1985  2002  -2.72 
Ireland 1970-2006  5  1984  -4.51  8  1981  1996  -5.24 
Italy 1970-2006  4  1989  -4.40  1  1981  1996  -4.46 
Luxembourg 1970-2006  8  1988 -5.23  8 1992  1998  -5.22 
Netherlands 1975-2006  1  1981  -3.42  6  1981  1996  -4.94 
Portugal 1973-2006  1  1982  -3.94  4  1986  1996  -4.87 
Spain 1970-2006  4  1991  -4.98  1  1993  1996  -2.42 
Sweden 1970-2006  1  1991  -3.87  6  1991  2003  -4.61 
United Kingdom  1970-2006  6  1985  -4.56  6  1981  1999  -5.92 
a – The ‘exact’ critical values are calculated based on 7,000 replications of a Monte Carlo simulation as described in 
Zivot and Andrews (1992, p. 262) and are respectively -6.68 (1 per cent level), -5.82 (5 per cent level) and -5.37 (10 per 
cent level). 
b – ** denotes statistical significance of the first structural break at the 5 per cent level of significance. 
c – ** denotes statistical significance of the second structural break at the 5 per cent level of significance. 
d - The ‘exact’ critical values are calculated based on 7,000 replications of a Monte Carlo simulation as described in Lumsdaine and 
Papell (1997), and are respectively -8.78 (1 per cent  level), -7.47 (5 per cent  level), and -6.98 (10 per cent level). 
# 
 , 
# #
 , 
# # #
  denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent  levels of significance respectively. 
** denotes statistical significance of the structural break at the 5 per cent level of significance.  
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Appendix D. Panel unit root tests, additional results 
 
Table D1 – Panel data unit root tests for the government debt-to-GDP ratio  
(1970-2006) 
 
Method Statistic  P-value*  Cross-sections  Observ. 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process) 
Levin, Lin & Chu t*  0.54469  0.7070  15  525 
Breitung t-stat  -1.30967  0.0952  15  510 
Null: Unit root (assumes an individual unit root process) 
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat   1.68879  0.9544  15  525 
ADF – Fisher Chi-square  24.5988  0.7443  15  525 
PP – Fisher Chi-square  8.90810  0.9999  15  540 
Null: No unit root (assumes a common unit root process) 
Hadri Z-stat  9.33368  0.0000  15  555 
 
* Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi-square distribution. All other tests 
assume asymptotic normality. 
Automatic selection of maximum lags. Automatic selection of lags based on SIC: 0 to 2. Newey-West 
bandwidth selection using a Bartlett kernel 
 
Table D2 – Panel data unit root tests for the primary balance-to-GDP ratio  
(1970-2006) 
 
Method Statistic  P-value*  Cross-sections  Observ. 
Null: Unit root (assumes a common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t*  -2.77057  0.0028  15  525 
Breitung t-stat  -3.74204  0.0001  15  510 
Null: Unit root (assumes an individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat   -4.34773  0.0000  15  525 
ADF – Fisher Chi-square  76.1011  0.0000  15  525 
PP – Fisher Chi-square  49.9668  0.0125  15  525 
Null: No unit root (assumes a common unit root process)  
Hadri Z-stat  4.62685  0.0000  15  525 
 
* Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi-square distribution. All other tests 
assume asymptotic normality. 
Automatic selection of maximum lags. Automatic selection of lags based on SIC: 0 to 2. Newey-West 
bandwidth selection using a Bartlett kernel 
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